# Exhibit 3

# Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election

Volume I of II

Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III

Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c)

Washington, D.C.

March 2019

## TABLE OF CONTENTS – VOLUME I

Introduc	CTION TO VOLUME I	1
EXECUTIV	E SUMMARY TO VOLUME I	4
I. THE SPI	ECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION	11
II. Russia	AN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN	14
A.	Structure of the Internet Research Agency	15
B.	Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin	16
C.	The IRA Targets U.S. Elections	19
	1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014	19
	2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts	22
	3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook	24
	4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter	26
	a. Individualized Accounts	26
	b. IRA Botnet Activities	28
	5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies	29
	6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons	31
	7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign	33
	a. Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials	33
	b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies	35
III. Russi	AN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS	36
A.	GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign	36
	1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign	36
	2. Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks	38
	a. Initial Access	38
	b. Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Networks	38
	c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks	40
B.	Dissemination of the Hacked Materials	41
	1. DCLeaks	41
	2. Guccifer 2.0	42
	3. Use of WikiLeaks	44
	a. WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign	44
	b. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks	45

		c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks	45
		d. WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials	48
C.	Ac	lditional GRU Cyber Operations	49
	1.	Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims	49
	2.	Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections	50
D.	Tr	ump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials	51
	1.	HOM	51
		a. Background	51
		b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks	52
		c. Harm to Ongoing Matter	54
		d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails	
		e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks	59
	2.	Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials	61
		a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg)	61
		b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails	62
IV. Russi	IAN	GOVERNMENT LINKS TO AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN	66
A.	Ca	mpaign Period (September 2015 – November 8, 2016)	66
	1.	Trump Tower Moscow Project	67
		a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014)	67
		b. Communications with I.C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015)	69
		c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015- January 2016)	70
		i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization.	70
		ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia	72
		d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump (December 2015-June 2016)	76
		i. Sater's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia	76
		ii. Candidate Trump's Opportunities to Travel to Russia	78
	2.	George Papadopoulos	80
		a. Origins of Campaign Work	81
		b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts	82
		c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting	85

	d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has "Dirt" in the Form of Clinton Emails	86
	e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign	89
	f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of "Dirt"	
	g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact	
3.		
	a. Background	96
	b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work	97
	c. Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow	98
	d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign	102
4.	Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest	103
	a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign	103
	b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel	
	c. Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI	
	d. Jared Kushner's Continuing Contacts with Simes	
5.	June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower	110
	a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting	110
	i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr	110
	ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign	
	b. The Events of June 9, 2016	116
	i. Arrangements for the Meeting	116
	ii. Conduct of the Meeting	117
	c. Post-June 9 Events	120
6.	Events at the Republican National Convention	123
	a. Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the Week of the RNC	123
	b. Change to Republican Party Platform	124
7.	Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak	127
	a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador's Residence	127
	b. Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak	127
8.	Paul Manafort	129
	a Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine	131

	i. Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work	131
	ii. Political Consulting Work	132
	iii. Konstantin Kilimnik	132
	b. Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign	134
	i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign	134
	ii. Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts	135
	iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantii Kilimnik in the United States	
	c. Post-Resignation Activities	141
В. Р	ost-Election and Transition-Period Contacts	144
1	. Immediate Post-Election Activity	144
	a. Outreach from the Russian Government	145
	b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels	146
2	2. Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration	147
	a. Background	147
	b. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming Administration	149
	c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles	151
	i. George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev	
	ii. The Seychelles Meetings	153
	iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip	155
	d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U.SRussia Relations	156
3	6. Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in Trump Tower Following the Election	159
۷	Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov	161
5	5. Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team	163
$\epsilon$	6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich	166
7	7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn	167
	a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements	167
	b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia	168
V. Prosecu	TION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS	174
A. I	Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign	174

В.	Ru	ssian Hacking and Dumping Operations	. 175
	1.	Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy	. 175
		a. Background	. 175
		b. Charging Decision As to Harm to Ongoing Matter	. 176
	2.	Potential Section 1030 Violation By Personal Privacy	. 179
C.	Rus	ssian Government Outreach and Contacts	. 180
	1.	Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion	. 180
	2.	Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951)	. 181
		a. Governing Law	. 181
		b. Application	. 182
	3.	Campaign Finance	. 183
		a. Overview Of Governing Law	. 184
		b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting	. 185
		i. Thing-of-Value Element	. 186
		ii. Willfulness	. 187
		iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information	. 188
		c. Application to WikiLeaks <b>HOM</b>	. 188
		i. Questions Over Harm to Ongoing Matter	1.00
		·· will a t	
		ii. Willfulness	
		iii. Constitutional Considerations	
	4	iv. Analysis HOM	
	4.	False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation	
		a. Overview Of Governing Law	
		b. Application to Certain Individuals	
		i. George Papadopoulos	
		Personal Privacy	
		iii. Michael Flynn	
		iv. Michael Cohen	
		vi. Jeff Sessions	
		vii. Others Interviewed During the Investigation	. 198

### **Investigative Technique**


1/6

On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from the Podesta email account. In total, WikiLeaks released 33 tranches of stolen emails between October 7, 2016 and November 7, 2016. The releases included private speeches given by Clinton;<sup>177</sup> internal communications between Podesta and other high-ranking members of the Clinton Campaign;<sup>178</sup> and correspondence related to the Clinton Foundation.<sup>179</sup> In total, WikiLeaks released over 50,000 documents stolen from Podesta's personal email account. The last-in-time email released from Podesta's account was dated March 21, 2016, two days after Podesta received a spearphishing email sent by the GRU.

#### d. WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials

As reports attributing the DNC and DCCC hacks to the Russian government emerged, WikiLeaks and Assange made several public statements apparently designed to obscure the source of the materials that WikiLeaks was releasing. The file-transfer evidence described above and other information uncovered during the investigation discredit WikiLeaks's claims about the source of material that it posted.

Beginning in the summer of 2016, Assange and WikiLeaks made a number of statements about Seth Rich, a former DNC staff member who was killed in July 2016. The statements about Rich implied falsely that he had been the source of the stolen DNC emails. On August 9, 2016, the @WikiLeaks Twitter account posted: "ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks has decided to issue a US\$20k reward for information leading to conviction for the murder of DNC staffer Seth Rich." Likewise, on August 25, 2016, Assange was asked in an interview, "Why are you so interested in Seth Rich's killer?" and responded, "We're very interested in anything that might be a threat to alleged Wikileaks sources." The interviewer responded to Assange's statement by commenting, "I know you don't want to reveal your source, but it certainly sounds like you're suggesting a man who leaked information to WikiLeaks was then murdered." Assange replied, "If there's someone who's potentially connected to our publication, and that person has been murdered in suspicious



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>179</sup> *Netyksho* Indictment ¶ 43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>180</sup> @WikiLeaks 8/9/16 Tweet.

circumstances, it doesn't necessarily mean that the two are connected. But it is a very serious matter...that type of allegation is very serious, as it's taken very seriously by us." 181

After the U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was behind the hacking operation, Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. According to media reports, Assange told a U.S. congressman that the DNC hack was an "inside job," and purported to have "physical proof" that Russians did not give materials to Assange.<sup>182</sup>

#### C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations

While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and WikiLeaks, GRU officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in several states.

#### 1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims

On July 27, 2016, Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton's personal office . Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that included the following: "Russia, if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press." The "30,000 emails" were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State.

Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement, GRU officers targeted for the first time Clinton's personal office. After candidate Trump's remarks, Unit 26165 created and sent malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain account belonging to Clinton aide. The investigation did not find evidence of earlier GRU attempts to compromise accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was able to identify these email accounts, which were not public. 184

Unit 26165 officers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service

Personal Privacy

On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate copies of the DNC data using function designed to allow users to produce backups of databases (referred to see as "snapshots"). The GRU then stole those snapshots by moving

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> See Assange: "Murdered DNC Staffer Was 'Potential' WikiLeaks Source," Fox News (Aug. 25, 2016)(containing video of Assange interview by Megyn Kelly).

 $<sup>^{182}</sup>$  M. Raju & Z. Cohen, A GOP Congressman's Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange, CNN (May 23, 2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>183</sup> "Donald Trump on Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails," YouTube Channel C-SPAN, Posted 7/27/16, *available at* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU (starting at 0:41).

<sup>184</sup> Investigative Technique